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Using an experimental setup that simulates a turbulent atmosphere, we study the secret key rate
for quantum key distribution protocols in orbital angular momentum based free space quantum
communication. The quantum key distribution protocols under consideration include the Ekert 91
protocol for different choices of mutually unbiased bases and the six-state protocol. We find that the
secret key rate of these protocols decay to zero roughly at the same scale where the entanglement
of formation decays to zero.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the first crypto-
graphic method that is based on the laws of quantum
mechanics. In principle, it provides a means to commu-
nicate securely against eavesdropping, by establishing a
secret key between two authenticated parties that can be
used for secret communication. This is the first exper-
imentally realizable application of quantum information
processing and has drawn the attention of a large com-
munity in both theory [1] and experiment [2].
To replace classical cryptographic technology, which
are in general not secure against attacks using nascent
quantum computing technology, methods are sought to
achieve QKD with high transmission rates over large dis-
tances. Even though the implementation technique for
QKD has reached the commercial level [3], the transmis-
sion distances and rates, are still comparatively small.
The most robust quantum channels for QKD are cur-
rently based on optical fibers, with transmission distances
of between 20 km and 150 km and maximal bit rates of
between 10 kbit and 1 Mbit per second [4].
The free space implementation of QKD could enable
intercontinental transmission channels using satellites [5].
A possible candidate as information carrier with high
information capacity is the orbital angular momentum
(OAM) modal basis of photons [6]. However, while the
existence of infinitely many OAM modes, in principle,
allows one to encode an arbitrary amount of information
in a single photon, these modes are susceptible to the
influence of atmospheric turbulence (see Fig. 1). Apart
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from its adverse affect on spatial modal multiplexing in
free space optical communication [7], the distortion of
spatial modes also causes the decay of coherence and re-
duces the transmission rate of secure keys in free space
quantum communication. In other words, the effect of
turbulence on the propagation of OAM modes decides
whether these modes can contribute to efficient quantum
key generation over large distances.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Experimentally measured effect of
turbulence on the intensity distributions of OAM modes for
ℓ = 0, 1, 3. First column without turbulence (W = 0). Second
and third columns with progressively more severe turbulence
conditions (W = 1 and 3, respectively).
2Various aspects of OAM modes propagating through
turbulence have been considered theoretically, including
the detection probability of OAM modes [8], attenua-
tion and crosstalk among multiple OAM channels [9],
the decay of entanglement for bipartite qubits [10, 11],
and the quantum channel capacity [12]. A few experi-
mental studies of the effect of turbulence on the OAM
modes have also been reported [13, 14]. Some groups
proposed methods to overcome the effect of turbulence
on free space optical or quantum communication. These
include, the use of post-processing (adaptive optics) [15]
and pre-processing (robust states [16] and optimal encod-
ing [17]) schemes. QKD protocols using qubit or multi-
dimensional mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) encoded
by means of OAMmodes were recently tested experimen-
tally [18]. However, these studies only consider the effect
of additional noise (such as turbulence) in the transmis-
sion channel, at a superficial level, if at all.
FIG. 2. (Color online) Comparison of the secret key rates of
the E91 protocol and the six-state protocol, as a function of
the quantum bit error rate.
In this article, we report on an experimental study of
the influence of turbulence on the secret key rate for cer-
tain QKD protocols. For this purpose we prepare two
photons in a maximally entangled state, using sponta-
neous parametric down-conversion (SPDC). We restrict
the number of OAM modes to two (qubits) and simu-
late the effect of atmospheric turbulence on both pho-
tons through phase modulation by a single phase screen
in each of the beam paths. Using the same setup as in
[14], we investigate qubits encoded with various combi-
nations of OAM values. We study two QKD protocols:
E91 [19] with different sets of MUBs and the six-state
protocol [20]. These protocols are realized by performing
measurements in the eigenbasis of the Pauli matrices on
both photons. Since there are three MUBs for two di-
mensions one has three ways to select two sets of MUBs
for the E91 protocol. For the six-state protocol we per-
form measurements in all three MUBs (the complete set
for qubits) [21].
We find that secure QKD is possible over distances up
to where entanglement decays to zero, but with lower
secret key rate than entanglement of formation.
II. THEORY
For qubits (two-dimensional systems) the sets of eigen-
states of the respective Pauli operators form MUBs. The
three Pauli operators can be expressed as
σˆx = |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1| (1)
σˆy = i(|1〉 〈0| − |0〉 〈1|) (2)
σˆz = |0〉 〈0| − |1〉 〈1| . (3)
The corresponding bases (sets of eigenstates) that are
associated with the respective Pauli operators, are
Mx =
{
1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)
}
(4)
My =
{
1√
2
(|0〉 ± i |1〉)
}
(5)
Mz = {|0〉 , |1〉} . (6)
These bases are mutually unbiased in that the measure-
ment of a basis vector of one of these sets (say Mx) in
terms of another one of these bases (say My) leads to
equi-probable outcomes.
The first quantum key distribution protocol was devel-
oped by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84 protocol)
[22]. The entanglement-based version of the BB84 proto-
col was developed by Ekert in 1991 (E91 protocol) [19].
In this protocol, the two parties, Alice and Bob, each ob-
tain one subsystem of a maximally entangled state. In
this study we use the Bell state
∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉). (7)
Each of the two parties, Alice and Bob, then randomly
chooses a measurement basis from a set of two MUBs,
{M1,M2}, which could be any two of the bases shown
in Eqs. (4) to (6), and perform a measurement on its
respective subsystems in the chosen basis. The two par-
ties repeat this process for a large number n of quantum
states and keep a record of their respective measurement
outcomes, as well as the basis in which the measurements
were performed. Alice and Bob, then publicly compare
their measurement bases and keep only those results for
which their bases matched, discarding the rest. This so-
called sifting process would ideally result in an identical
key for both parties.
Another QKD protocol of interest is the six-state
protocol [20], which is a straight-forward generalization
of E91. The six-state protocol uses three orthonor-
mal MUBs {M1,M2,M3} [the three MUBs shown in
Eqs. (4) to (6)], instead of just two. The rest of the proto-
col is analogous to E91. The six-state protocol produces
3a higher secret key rate than E91 for the same quantum
bit error rate, as shown in Fig. 2.
In the ideal scenario the protocols discussed above gen-
erate identical keys for Alice and Bob. However, differ-
ences between both keys can arise from disturbances due
to eavesdropping, but also from imperfections in the state
preparation, the transmission and the measurement pro-
cess. It is rather difficult to differentiate between the
error caused by eavesdropping and the errors of other
origins. Therefore, it is safest to assign all the differences
to eavesdropping. To estimate the average error, both
parties compare a small portion of their measurements
and calculate the so-called quantum bit error rate Q. It
is given by the probability that Alice sends the state |ψ〉
and Bob projects, in an ideal measurement, onto an or-
thogonal state |ψ⊥〉. In the entanglement-based proto-
cols, the quantum bit error rate Q is
Q =
1
L
L∑
β=1
∑
k 6=k′
tr
(∣∣∣ψβk〉〈ψβk ∣∣∣⊗ ∣∣∣ψβk′〉〈ψβk′ ∣∣∣ ρAB) (8)
where ρ
AB
is the combined state of the system shared
by Alice and Bob, whereas |ψk〉 and |ψk′〉 are the states
on which their measurements project in case they chose
the same basis. The index β numerates the chosen bases
and L is the number of bases available in the protocol:
L = 2 and L = 3, for E91 and the six-state protocols,
respectively.
The efficiency of the protocol is quantified by the se-
cret key rate r, which represents the average number of
secret key bits that can be distilled from each transmitted
qubit by means of key sifting and privacy amplification
[23]. The maximum number of secret key bits per trans-
mitted two-level system is given by r = 1. However, the
expression of the minimum number of secret key bits rmin
for a given value of the quantum bit error rate Q, for E91
(and BB84) reads [23, 24]
rmin = 1 + 2(1−Q) log2(1−Q) + 2Q log2 (Q) , (9)
and for the six-state protocol it is given by
rmin = 1 +
3
2
Q log2
(
Q
2
)
+
(
1− 3
2
Q
)
log2
(
1− 3
2
Q
)
.
(10)
In a comparison of key rates, the six-state protocol pro-
duces a higher secret key rate than E91 for the same
quantum bit error rate, as shown in Fig. 2.
While the secret key rate is a measure for the efficiency
of a particular QKD protocol, the amount of entangle-
ment (quantified by the entanglement of formation) be-
tween the pairs of photons that arrive at Alice and Bob
quantifies the quantum correlations that could be used
to generate secret key bits shared by Alice and Bob [25].
The entanglement of formation between two two-level
photonic systems is calculated from the average joint den-
sity matrix of this bipartite system as [26],
E = h
(
1 +
√
1− C2
2
)
, (11)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function, given by
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1 − x), (12)
and C is the concurrence, which is defined as
C = max{0,
√
λ1 −
√
λ2 −
√
λ3 −
√
λ4}. (13)
In Eq. (13) the λn’s are the eigenvalues, in decreasing
order, of the matrix ρ˜ = ρ(σy ⊗ σy)ρ∗(σy ⊗ σy), where
∗ represents the complex conjugate and σy is the Pauli
spin matrix.
III. EXPERIMENT
We implement these protocols in terms of the OAM
degree of freedom of entangled photons. Entangled pairs
of photons are prepared with the aid of SPDC, as ex-
plained below. These entangled pairs are then dis-
tributed through noisy channels (simulated turbulence)
to two projective measurement setups (Alice and Bob).
The projective measurements are made in terms of the
helical modal basis (approximating Laguerre-Gaussian
modes with radial index p=0). We’ll denote this basis
by {|ℓ〉} where ℓ represents the OAM index of the mode.
For the purpose of the QKD protocols, we define the
MUBs by replacing |0〉 → |−ℓ〉 and |1〉 → |ℓ〉 in Eqs. (4)
to (6), giving
M1 = {|−ℓ〉 , |ℓ〉} (14)
M2 =
{
1√
2
(|−ℓ〉 ± |ℓ〉)
}
(15)
M3 =
{
1√
2
(|−ℓ〉 ± i |ℓ〉)
}
. (16)
We perform these measurements for ℓ= 1, 3, 5 and 7.
Our aim to study the effect of atmospheric turbulence
on the secret key rate r is realized in the laboratory by
simulating the propagation of the photons in a turbulent
atmosphere, using spatial light modulators (SLMs). The
influence of atmospheric turbulence on an optical beam,
in weak scintillation conditions, can be simulated by an
SLM that is encoded with a random phase function (as
caused by fluctuations of the refractive index of turbulent
air) in a single transversal plane of the beam [8]. To
simulate the turbulent atmosphere, in agreement with
the Kolmogorov theory of turbulence [27], we compute
the random phase function on the SLM as [28]
θ(x, y) =
k0
√
2πL
∆k
F−1
{
χ(k⊥)
√
Φn(|k⊥|)
}
, (17)
4where k0 is the wavenumber (= 2π/λ where λ is the
wavelength of the light), L is the propagation distance,
∆k is the sampling interval in the frequency domain,
F−1{·} is the two-dimensional inverse Fourier transform,
k⊥ is the two-dimensional wave vector in the transverse
Fourier domain, and χ(k⊥) is a frequency domain delta-
correlated zero-mean Gaussian pseudo-random complex
function, obeying χ∗(k⊥) = χ(−k⊥), because θ(x, y) is
real-valued. The refractive index power spectral density
is expressed as [27, 29]
Φn(k) = 0.033C
2
nk
−11/3, (18)
where C2n is the refractive index structure constant, which
determines the strength of the turbulence and k is the
magnitude of the spatial frequency vector.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Mode scattering induced by turbu-
lence. These figures show the coincidence counts as we mea-
sure simultaneously modes with ℓA in the signal beam and
ℓB in the idler beam. (a) With no turbulence, only anti-
correlated coincidences are observed. (b), (c) and (d) Pro-
gressively more severe turbulence conditions produce progres-
sively more off-diagonal (uncorrelated) coincidence counts.
The distortion that is introduced by the modulation
of the optical beams by the random phase functions on
the SLMs leads to crosstalk between OAM modes. One
can observe this crosstalk in terms of the decay of cor-
relations between the OAM modes for a down-converted
pair of photons. This is demonstrated by the graphs in
Fig. 3, which show how the anti-correlation between the
OAM index of the two down-converted photons deterio-
rates with increasing scintillation, as introduced by the
random phase function on the SLMs.
In our simulated turbulence experiment, the turbu-
lence strength is combined with the wavelength and the
propagation distance into the Fried parameter, which, for
plane waves, is given by
r0 = 0.185
(
λ2
C2nL
)3/5
. (19)
One can define a dimensionless quantity
W = w0
r0
, (20)
where w0 is the beam radius. SinceW contains the prop-
agation distance, it can be regarded as an indication of
scintillation strength rather than turbulence strength. It
was found [10] that, under weak scintillation conditions,
the evolution of the entanglement of a photon pair that
is entangled in its spatial degrees of freedom (such as
OAM), is completely determined by W . In our experi-
ment we assume weak scintillation and simulate the tur-
bulence with a single phase screen. As a result the pa-
rameter that we use to quantify the strength of the scin-
tillation/turbulence is W .
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Experimental setup to generate and
measure entangled photon pairs. A UV laser source pumps a
type-I BBO crystal to produce pairs of entangled photons via
SPDC. The crystal plane is imaged onto the SLMs and each
SLM plane is imaged onto the input of a SMF.
Our experimental setup is shown diagrammatically in
Fig. 4. It is identical to the one used in [14]. Entangled
photon pairs are generated, using SPDC, by pumping
a type-I Barium borate (BBO) crystal with a 355 nm
laser. The collinear, degenerate down-converted photons
are imaged via a 4f-system from the BBO crystal plane
to the two separate SLMs. These HoloEye SLMs consist
of 1920 × 1080 pixels, with a pixel size of 8 µm. The
photon pairs are projected onto particular helical modes,
depending on the helical phase functions that are encoded
onto the SLMs. The expression for the transmission (re-
flection) function of the SLMs encoded with these helical
phase functions is
t(φ) = exp(iℓφ), (21)
where φ is the azimuthal coordinate and ℓ is the OAM
index (an integer). Random phase functions are added to
each SLM to simulate propagation through atmospheric
turbulence. The resulting optical fields after the SLMs
are then imaged via a 4f-system onto the input facet of
single-mode fibers (SMFs). The single photons are de-
tected with avalanche photo diodes (APDs), which are
connected to a coincidence counter (CC) with a gating
time of 12.5 ns.
5FIG. 5. (Color online) Measured secret key rates of E91 for three different possible choices of the two bases and six-state
protocol as a function of W = w0/r0 for different OAM encodings.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Using the projective measurements in the helical basis,
we perform quantum state tomography to reproduce the
density matrices for the observed quantum states in the
two-qubit Hilbert spaces given by the particular value
of ℓ. Such a quantum state tomography is performed
by cycling through the different bases composed of the
OAM modes in the restricted Hilbert space on each SLM
and recording the coincidence count rates. This quantum
state tomography is repeated 30 times, with different sets
of random phase functions (different realizations of the
turbulent medium), for each value ofW , within the range
0 ≤ W ≤ 4, and for each of the four values of ℓ=1, 3,
5, and 7. The resulting density matrices are averaged to
obtain a mean density matrix for a given W and ℓ.
These mean density matrices are used to calculate the
quantum bit error rate Q, with the aid of Eq. (8), and
then the minimal secret key rates rmin for the E91 pro-
tocol, using Eq. (9), and for the six-state protocol, using
Eq. (10). The mean density matrices are also used to
compute the entanglement of formation with the aid of
Eq. (11). These minimal secret key rates rmin are shown,
together with the entanglement of formation (EoF), as a
function of W in Fig. 5. The calculation of rmin for the
E91 protocol is done for all three different ways of choos-
ing the two MUBs from those in Eqs. (14) to (16). The
curves denoted by E91 (a), (b) and (c) in Fig. 5 represent
the three cases where the chosen MUBs are {M1,M3},
{M1,M2} and {M2,M3}, respectively. All the MUBs
in Eqs. (14) to (16) are used for the six-state protocol.
Although the qualitative behavior of rmin and the EoF
is the same, the former is lower than the latter and the
former also decays to zero at a smaller value of W than
the latter. This could be caused by a non-optimal choice
of the measurement bases in the experiment. By choosing
bases that are more optimal, one may be able to increase
the minimal secret key rate rmin.
Comparing the secret key rate of the different QKD
protocols, as shown in Fig. 5, we find that the secret key
rate in the E91 protocols are in general lower than that of
the six-state protocol. This result is to be expected, since
the six-state protocol is known to produce a higher secret
key rate than E91 for the same quantum bit error rate
(see Fig. 2). Moreover, the choice of MUBs for the E91
protocol makes a slight difference in the performance: the
set {M2,M3} gives slightly better performance than the
other two choices for larger values of W .
The aim of our experiment is to simulate the effect of
atmospheric turbulence on down-converted pairs of pho-
tons, which are entangled in their spatial degrees of free-
dom. This allows us to study the security of QKD pro-
6tocols that employ this type of entanglement resource
in free space communication. Under weak scintillation
conditions (as assumed in our experiment), the distance
scale at which the concurrence decays to zero can be esti-
mated from the observation (see Fig. 5) that, up to some
numerical factor of order 1, the entanglement of forma-
tion decays to zero when W ≈ 1. According to numer-
ical simulation results [14], the relationship is actually
W ≈
√
ℓ. The resulting concurrence decay distance scale
is then given by [14]
Ldec ≈ 0.06λ
2ℓ5/6
w
5/3
0 C
2
n
, (22)
where the numerical constant can vary within an order of
magnitude. Hence, the distance over which QKD can be
operated successfully through a free space channel, de-
pends on the dimension parameters and the OAM index,
as shown in Eq. (22).
As an example, consider the challenge of replicating a
previous reported free space QKD experiment with po-
larization entangled photons over a distance of 144 km
[2]. Here C2n ≈ 5 × 10−16 m−2/3 and w0 ≈ 50 mm for
a photon wavelength of 710 nm. If an ℓ = 1 qubit basis
was used, the transmission distance for the same experi-
mental parameters would be a little less than 10 km, or
roughly an order of magnitude less than for polarization.
The 144 km distance could only be reached (under the
same experimental conditions) by using large OAM val-
ues, ℓ > 25. This reinforces the very motivation for OAM
as a basis for encoding information: its value lies in re-
alizing higher dimensional states and not in replicating
qubit states.
It should be noted that distance estimations are here
made under the assumption of weak scintillation condi-
tions, which require that the distance is smaller than the
Rayleigh range. However, by varying some of the pa-
rameters, one can obtain a distance that is larger than
the Rayleigh range, in which case it would extend into
a region where the weak scintillation condition does not
apply anymore. As a result the predicted distance would
not be reliable. To obtain reliable predictions of oper-
ating distances under strong scintillation conditions, one
needs to employ multiple phase screen methods [11].
V. SUMMARY
We performed an experimental study of the effect of
atmospheric turbulence on the security of certain QKD
protocols: E91 with different choices of MUBs and the
six-state protocol. We found that, in the weak scintil-
lation limit, one can distribute a quantum key securely
over distances comparable to those over which the entan-
glement survives, but at a slightly lower secret key rate
compared to the entanglement of formation.
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